Members get the incident lessons. Students get the public record.

An AI knowledge assistant for process safety associations. Every answer is cited to the page, and drawn only from the tiers each member holds.

30 minutes, on your own documents.

Question: What were the root causes of the Texas City explosion?

asked by all three

Maren Holt, Process safety engineer, Corporate

The CSB traced the March 2005 explosion, 15 killed and 180 injured citation 1, to failures at three levels:

Board: The Group Board “did not provide effective oversight” of safety culture citation 2
Site: No reporting and learning culture; procedures were not enforced citation 2
Unit: No flare on the blowdown system; no automated high-level controls citation 3

CSB report page 210, root causes, with the cited sentence highlighted

2 · p.210

CSB 2005-04-I-TXp.17

p.210

p.211

3 tiers searched · 3 pages citedCited

Luis Arce, Plant operations supervisor, Member

The CSB traced the March 2005 explosion, 15 killed and 180 injured citation 1, to failures at three levels:

Board: The Group Board “did not provide effective oversight” of safety culture citation 2
Site: No reporting and learning culture; procedures were not enforced citation 2
Unit: No flare on the blowdown system; no automated high-level controls citation 3

2 · p.210

CSB 2005-04-I-TXp.17

p.210

p.211

2 tiers searched · 3 pages citedCited

Jordan Pike, Engineering student, Public

Not in your accessThe CSB final reports are Member content.

Request access

From the public recordThe CSB investigated the March 23, 2005 explosion at BP Texas City: 15 killed, 180 injured. Its root-cause findings sit in the final report.

Member content · p.210

1 tier searched · 0 report pages cited

Examples are built on public documents; access tiers are simulated.PublicMemberCorporate

Each report sits in the ring its members pay for.

Part 68 lives on the Corporate ring, so a member’s answer never quotes it.

Ask “What were the root causes of the Texas City explosion?” as

Luis ArceStrong match

The CSB traced the March 2005 explosion, 15 killed and 180 injured citation 1, to failures at three levels:

Board: The Group Board “did not provide effective oversight” of safety culture citation 2
Site: No reporting and learning culture; procedures were not enforced citation 2
Unit: No flare on the blowdown system; no automated high-level controls citation 3

CSB 2005-04-I-TXp.17

p.210

p.211

p.210

CSB 2005-04-I-TXMember ring · open to Luis

2 tiers searched · 3 pages cited · Part 68 never opened

Every line of the answer opens on its page.

Ask about Texas City. Each claim points to the sentence in the CSB report, highlighted.

CSB 2005-04-I-TX · Refinery Explosion and Fire, BP Texas City

CSB report page 17, executive summary, with the sentences on the deaths and injuries highlighted — **1.0 Executive summary**p.17

CSB report page 210, root causes, with the Board finding highlighted — **12.1 Root causes**p.210

CSB report page 211, root causes continued, with the missing flare and automated controls highlighted — **12.1 Root causes, continued**p.211

Change reviews, drafted and held.

And no numbers your library doesn’t hold.

MOC-2026-0142 · Relief valve PSV-3107 review

Nothing is written until Tomasz Brandt, PSM manager, approves it.

Done: Requested
Done: Dry run
Now: Approving
Next: Approved
Next: Record created

moc.open_reviewHarrow Bend MOC registerMOC-2026-0142

titleNew relief valve PSV-3107 on drum D-310

technical_basisRelief load for revised feed rate(l)(2)(i)

safety_health_impactRevalidate PHA node 4(l)(2)(ii)

procedure_changesSOP-D310-02, revision C(l)(2)(iii)

time_periodPermanent(l)(2)(iv)

authorizationTomasz Brandt, PSM manager(l)(2)(v)

Approve and runReject5 of 5 MOC considerations

“What’s the safe operating limit for our reactor R-101?”

Rule P-02: refuse, and point to the plant’s own process safety information.

“I can only answer from the Process Safety Library materials, and they don’t cover that.”

Reactor R-101Harrow Bend Chemical
Your PSISafe upper and lower limits1910.119(d)(2)(i)(D)
Operating procedureOperating limits1910.119(f)(1)(ii)

0 passages on R-101 · 0 numbers made

Use cases

Each problem, shown with real answers.

Process safety · Tiers

30 minutes, on your own documents.

We map your tiers to rings and ask one question as three of your members.

Members get the incident lessons. Students get the public record.

Each report sits in the ring its members pay for.

Every line of the answer opens on its page.

Change reviews, drafted and held.

MOC-2026-0142 · Relief valve PSV-3107 review

“What’s the safe operating limit for our reactor R-101?”

Use cases

Members get the incident lessons. Students get the public record.

Every answer comes with the page it’s on.

Plant-specific questions get a plain “not covered”, never a made-up number.

Planning guidance comes with the warning you set.

See what members asked and couldn’t find, then close the gap.

Your library inside members’ own AI tools, with their tiers.

30 minutes, on your own documents.